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COOPERATIVE GAMES ON SIMPLICIAL COMPLEXES
IVAN MARTINO
Abstract. In this work, we define cooperative games on simplicial complexes, generalizing
the study of probabilistic values of Weber [Web88] and quasi-probabilistic values of Bilbao,
Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01].
Applications to Multi-Touch Attribution and the interpretability of the Machine-Learning predic-
tion models motivate these new developments [LL17, RSG16, SK13, SPK17, DSZ16, BBM+15].
We deal with the axiomatization provided by the λi-dummy and the monotonicity require-
ments together with a probabilistic form of the symmetric and the efficiency axioms.
We also characterize combinatorially the set of probabilistic participation influences as the facet
polytope of the simplicial complex.
A cooperative game is a pair (n, v) where n is a positive integer and v is the worth function
v : 2n → R, where 2n is the power set of [n] def= {1, . . . , n}. We assume that v(∅) = 0. The elements
of [n] are players of the game that may join in coalitions; a coalition T is a subset of [n] and v(T )
is the number of payoff of T in the cooperative game.
For every player i an individual value φi(v) is a (linear) function measuring the additional worth
that i provides to a coalition during the cooperative game (n, v). The study of such values was
extremely relevant for the community and we would like to highlight here a few important works
of Shapley [Sha53, Sha72] and Weber [Web88] that have influenced the author.
Recently, quite a lot of effort has been done to study cooperative games on matroids [BDJLL01,
BDJLL02, MTMZ19, MZ11, FV11, NZKI97, Zha99]. Inspired by this recent articles, in this
manuscript we define cooperative games on simplicial complexes and we study quasi-probabilistic
values for such games.
A simplicial complex is a family ∆ of subsets of [n] such that if X ∈ ∆, then every subset
Y ⊆ X will also belong to ∆. For instance, every graph and the full power set 2n are simplicial
complex. In the latter case, ∆ = 2n is called a (n − 1)-dimensional simplex. The reader may find
more examples all along the paper, but also highlighted in Figures 2, 1a, and 1b.
A cooperative game on ∆ is defined by a worth function v:
v : ∆→ R
with the usual constrain that v(∅) = 0. The traditional game (n, v) can be seen as the cooperative
game on the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex (2n, v), where the function v is the defines as in the
classical case.
In other words, in a cooperative game on a a simplicial complex ∆ a player i in [n] may join a
coalition T only if T ∪ i ∈ ∆. In such case, the coalition is feasible and, unfeasible otherwise.
Similarly as in the classical case, the individual function φi(v) measures the additional value that
i provide to a feasible coalition during the cooperative game (∆, v).
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Presentation of the results
We are going to present the new research developments and after this we provide several
motivation for this work. Further, we explain carefully a concrete application to Multi-Touch
Attribution and for this prototype example we show explicitely all the new introduced objects.
A player i is dummy for the cooperative game (∆, v) if the player does not provide better
results to the coalition then its own worth v({i}). In mathematical terms, i is a dummy player in
the cooperative game (∆, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ) + v({i}) for every i < S and S ∪ {i} ∈ ∆. For
simplicity we are going to neglect the set brackets for the singleton and write S ∪ i instead of
S ∪ {i} and v(i) instead of v({i}).
Moreover, we say that the worth function v is monotone if S ⊆ T ∈ ∆ implies v(S ) ≤ v(T ). We
denote by R(∆) the set of all cooperative game on the simplicial complex ∆.
Theorem 2 and 3 of [Web88] characterize the individual values that satisfies the dummy and
the monotonicity axioms. Theorem 3.1 of [BDJLL01] generalizes such results for cooperative
game on a matroids. Every matroid is a simplicial complex but not vice versa, see for instance
the example in Figure 2. Next theorem moves further and extends the results to every simplicial
complex ∆.
We denote by 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 the rate of participation of the player i in the cooperative game (∆, v)
and let us rewrite the two main conditions in Theorem 3.1 of [BDJLL01]:
λi-Dummy axiom: If the player i is dummy for (∆, v), then φi(v) = λiv(i);
Monotonicity axiom: If v is monotone, then φi(v) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.1. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex on n verticies and let φi be an individual value
for a player i. The individual value φi is a R-linear function satisfying the λi-Dummy axiom
and the Monotonicity axiom if and only if there exists a collection of non-negative real numbers
{piT : T ∈ Link∆ i} with ∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT = λi
such that for all v in R(∆),
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
The necessary and sufficient condition of the previous theorem hints a natural generalization
of probabilistic values for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. For this reason, Bilbao,
Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01] called, in the case of matroids, those values
qusi-probabilistic, see Section 3.
Recall that Facets ∆ is the set of facets of the simplicial complex ∆, these are sets in ∆ that are
maximal by inclusion. Moreover, Facets∆ i collects all the facets containing i. In addition, we
denote by F¯ the simplex on the verticies in F, i.e. F¯ = 2F .
Theorem 2.2. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let φi be an individual value for a player i in
[n].
The individual value φi is a quasi-probabilistic value if and only if there exists a probability
distribution {Pi(F1), . . . , Pi(Fk)} on Facets ∆ such that∑
F∈Facets∆ i
Pi(F) = λi,
2
and for every F ∈ Facets∆ i there exists an individual (classical) probabilistic value φFi defined
on the simplex F¯ such that for all v in R(∆),
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
Pi(F)φFi (v|F),
where v|F is the restriction of the cooperative game (∆, v) to (F, v|F).
The previous statement extends Theorem 3.2 in [BDJLL01] to every simplicial complex.
As in the traditional case, we collect all individual values together, in the group value φ =
(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn). For sake of presentation of the results, let us assume here that we work in the
efficient scenario, that is the individual values are nor optimistic or pessimistic. A group value φ
for the cooperative game (∆, v) is reducible if there exists a probability distribution P on the the
facets of ∆ such that
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
P(F)φFi (v|F).
where φFi is a probabilistic value for a cooperative game on the simplex F¯ and v|F is the restriction
of the characteristic function v on the simplex F, that is v|F(S ) = v(S ) for every subset S of F.
This notion was introduced in [BDJLL01] as basic value. Our choice for the adjective reducible
is made in view of the results in [Mar20a, Mar20b].
We denote by Prob ∆ the set of probability distribution over the set of facets of ∆. Following
Section 4 of[BDJLL01], we also define the probabilistic participation influence wP(T ) for the
coalition T as
wP(T ) def=
∑
T⊂F∈Facets ∆
P(F)
Using the result of Edmonds [Edm70] in (7), Bilbao, Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n
[BDJLL01] are able to show that
anticore([n], rkM)
(7)
= QM = {wP : P ∈ Prob M},
where QM is facet polytope of the matroid M, see Section 4.
Let Q∆ be the convex hull in Rn of vectors eF =
∑
i∈F ei for every facet F in Facets ∆, where
ei is a standard orthonormal basis of Rn, see Definition 4.2.
While the equality on the left does not hold for simplicial complexes, we are able to prove that
Q∆ = {wP : P ∈ Prob ∆}. Aside of the generalization per se of Proposition 4.1 of [BDJLL01],
one perk of the proof of next proposition is that we do not use Edmond result or any connection
with the anticore of the cooperative game.
Theorem 4.2. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let r be its rank function. Then
Q∆ = {wP : P ∈ Prob ∆}.
All these results together allow us to generalize the main theorem of [BDJLL01] to pure sim-
plicial complex, i.e. simplicial complex where all the facets have the same cardinality. The next
statement characterizes when an individual value is reducible to classical cooperative games de-
fined on the facets of the pure simplicial complex. To do this, we need two additional constrains:
Substitution for carrier games: For every feasible coalition T and for every pair of play-
ers, one has φi(vT ) = φ j(vT ) where vT is the carrier game defined in Definition 1.2;
Probabilistic efficiency: For every cooperative game (∆, v),
∑
i φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets ∆ P(F)v(F).
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(a) This simplicial complex is a ma-
troid.
1
2
3
4
5
(b) This simplicial complex is not a
matroid.
Figure 1. Two examples of pure simplicial complexes.
Theorem 5.1. Let ∆ be a pure simplicial complex on n verticies and and let φi be the individual
value for a player i. The group value φ is reducible and it decomposes as the weighted sum of
Shapley values,
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
P(F) ShapleyF(v|F).
if and only if each φi is a linear function that satisfies the wP(i)-dummy axiom and the group
value fulfills the Substitution for carrier games and the Probabilistic efficiency axioms.
The substitution axiom is the one enforcing that ∆ is a pure simplicial complex; the proba-
bilistic efficiency provides, instead, the weights of the decomposition of φi as sum of Shapley
values.
Motivations
It is worth to mention a few reasons why the generalization provided is relevant.
i) Not every pure simplicial complex is a matroid. Figure 1a and 1b show two pure simplicial
complex and only the one in the left is a matroid. Thus, the new results extend quite substantially
the results in Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.2 of [BDJLL01].
ii) Aside the generalization from matroids to simplicial complexes in it-self, our proofs of
the results show that the main matroidal properties are not useful in this context [Sta12, Sta96,
Sta84, Oxl11] and underline the importance of the link of the player, see Definition 1.1. This
will be crucial in the subsequent works [Mar20a, Mar20b].
iii) A ground-breaking application of the Shapley value methodology is in the interpretability
of the Machine-Learning prediction models, see for instance [LL17] and the Phyton package
SHAP [Github repository], see [RSG16, SK13, SPK17, DSZ16, BBM+15, LC01].
iv) Last but not the least, another very important application is that Google has started to use it
in its own multi-touch attribution system offered in Google 360. (This is the marketing platform
developed and offered by .)
The prototype example
We provide here a prototype motivating application of the new results: the Multi-Touch Attri-
bution in Marketing. In Marketing attribution the individual values are used to understand what
set of advertisements have influenced a person toward a desired behavior, typically becoming
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Figure 2. The simplicial complex describing the feasible coalitions for the co-
operative game of the prototype example.
a costumer. This is (classically) described as the following cooperative game. ∆ = 2n is the
simplex with verticies in the set of marketing channels, labeled for simplicity from 1 to n. To
each subset T of [n], the worth function v associates the number of conversions v(T ), people who
became costumers, influenced by the marketing channels in T . In other words, v(T ) counts the
number of individuals who decided to buy being effected by the advertisements collected in the
set T .
Unfortunately, the marketing team cannot always track down v(T ) for every subset of channels,
and setting v(T ) = 0 for those untraceable coalitions may results in technical problems such as
v is not anymore monotone, that is v(S ) ≤ v(T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆ [n]. The idea we propose is
to mark such coalition as unfeasible and to take them out from ∆. We still assume that if T is a
feasible coalition, then every subset of T is still feasible. Thus, ∆ is a simplicial complex, see
Section 1.1.
Example. The advertising campaign of a certain store is made of six different marketing chan-
nels: the distribution of flyers (F) and an advertising stand (S) in the weekly market of the
district, together with social network (FB), email (E), TV and search engine (G) advertisements.
The shop also offers a discount for on-line purchases that can be retrieved with a promotion code
in the flyers or by request in the stand.
Because of the nature of the data, the marketing team cannot analyze if conversions (individuals
who make a purchase decision) have been exposed by all the channels and in particular, they
can only track the following ones: every subsets of the channels {FB, S , F} and every subsets of
{FB,TV, E,G}. Figure 2 shows the simplicial complex ∆ of feasible coalitions:
∆ = {∅, {F}, {S }, {FB}, {E}, {TV}, {S , F}, {FB, F}, {FB, S }, {FB, S , F},
{FB, E}, {FB,TV}, {TV, E}, {FB,TV, E}, {FB,G}, {TV,G},
{FB,TV,G}, {E,G}, {FB, E,G}, {TV, E,G}} .
Breaking the prototype example down
Before moving to the preliminary definitions and proving all the presented results, we want
to provide the reader a concrete example by computing the quasi-probabilistic values for the
cooperative games in the previous example.
Assume that the cooperative game satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2.1 and enumerate the
set of marketing channels as {F, S , FB,TV, E,G} = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
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If we suppress the brackets notation for set and write, for instance 345 for the set {3, 4, 5}.
Then we write down the individual values as:
φ1(v) = p1∅v(1) + p
1
2(v(12) − v(2)) + p13(v(13) − v(3)) + p123(v(123) − v(23));
φ2(v) = p2∅v(2) + p
2
1(v(12) − v(1)) + p23(v(23) − v(3)) + p213(v(123) − v(13));
φ3(v) = p3∅v(3) + p
3
1(v(13) − v(1)) + p32(v(23) − v(2)) + p312(v(123) − v(12) +
+ p34(v(43) − v(4)) + p35(v(35) − v(5)) + p36(v(36) − v(6)) +
+ p345(v(345) − v(45)) + p346(v(346) − v(46)) + p356(v(356) − v(56));
φ4(v) = p4∅v(4) + p
4
3(v(34) − v(3)) + p45(v(45) − v(5)) + p46(v(46) − v(6)) +
+ p435(v(345) − v(35)) + p436(v(346) − v(36)) + p456(v(356) − v(56));
φ5(v) = p5∅v(5) + p
5
3(v(35) − v(3)) + p54(v(45) − v(4)) + p56(v(56) − v(6)) +
+ p534(v(345) − v(34)) + p536(v(356) − v(36)) + p546(v(456) − v(46));
φ6(v) = p6∅v(6) + p
6
3(v(36) − v(3)) + p65(v(56) − v(5)) + p64(v(46) − v(6)) +
+ p635(v(356) − v(35)) + p634(v(346) − v(36)) + p645(v(456) − v(45)).
Since ∆ is not pure, φ cannot be reduced as sum of Shapley values. It is also worth to mention
that the face polytope Q∆ that describes the convex all of probabilistic participation influence is
a polytope in R6 defined by 20 = 6 + 9 + 5 + 2 points.
Acknowledgments. The author is currently supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foun-
dation and by the Royal Swedish Academy of Science.
1. Preliminaries
Let n be a positive integer and we denote by [n] def= {1, . . . , n}.
1.1. Simplicial Complexes. A (finite) simplicial complex ∆ over n verticies is a family of sub-
sets in 2[n] such that if a set T is in ∆, then any of its subsets S ⊂ T will be in ∆ too. There is a
natural rank function, rank∆, on ∆ provided by the cardinality of its sets. The elements of ∆ that
are maximal by inclusions are called facets. The maximal value of this rank function is the rank
of the simplicial complex rank ∆.
All along this work ∆ is a finite simplicial complex over n verticies of rank r def= rank ∆. Let
Facets ∆ be the set of facets of ∆, Facets ∆ = {F1, . . . , Fk} and for every T ∈ ∆ let Facets∆ T be
the set of facets in ∆ that contain S .
If S is an element in ∆, then S¯ def= {T : T ⊆ S } = 2S is the simplicial complex obtained by all
sets contained in S . The next definition is extremely important for this work.
Definition 1.1. The link of of an element S in a simplicial complex ∆ is made by the subsets A
of T ∈ ∆, such that T is disjoint by S and can be completed by S , S ∪ T , to an element in ∆:
Link∆ S = {A : A ∈ T¯ with T ∈ ∆ such that S ∩ T = ∅, S ∪ T ∈ ∆}.
The case when S is the singleton {i} will be extremely relevant in our work: Link∆ i is the set of
simplex T in ∆ with i < T such that T ∪ i ∈ ∆:
Link∆ i = {T ∈ ∆ : i < T and T ∪ i ∈ ∆}.
6
1.2. Cooperative games on simplicial complexes. A cooperative game on the simplicial com-
plex ∆ is the pair (∆, v) where v is a worth function v : ∆ → R under the constrain v(∅) = 0.
(Here we mean that the function is defined on Set(∆), that is the collection of elements of ∆
forgetting the partial order.) The verticies [n] of the simplicial complex are the players of the
cooperative game and a coalition T is feasible if T ∈ ∆. The set R(∆) of characteristic functions
on ∆ is naturally a real vector space.
Two types of games have a very important role for the theory of probabilistic values, see
[Web88]. By abuse of notation we call both families carrier games even if the notion usually
refer only to the first family:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]},
where vT and vˆT are so defined:
vT (S ) =
1 T ⊆ S0 otherwise. , vˆT (S ) =
1 T ( S0 otherwise.
We generalize this definition for any element T of a simplicial complex. Indeed for every par-
tially order set (P,≤P) and every element q in P we consider the following function:
uPq (s)
def
=
1 q ≤P s0 otherwise. , uˆPq (s) def=
1 q <P s0 otherwise.
Thus, we define
vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ), vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ).
It is easy to see that in the classical case (when ∆ is a full simplex on n verticies) these functions
reproduce the carrier games.
Definition 1.2. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex. The sets of carrier games are so defined:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆},
where vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ) and vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ).
When T is the empty set, we define vˆ∅
def
= uˆ∆∅ .
We also denote by 1T the indicator function of the set T in ∆, that is:
1T (S )
def
=
1 T = S ∈ ∆0 otherwise. .
We observe that 1T = vT − vˆT .
Definition 1.3. An individual value for a player i in [n] is a function φi : R(∆)→ R.
The first axiom in the theory of probabilistic values is that these functions are linear, see
Section 3 of [Web88]. We are going to only consider linear individual values.
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2. Individual values for simplicial complexes
Recall that the player i is dummy in the cooperative game (∆, v) if v(S ∪ i) = v(S ) + v(i) for
every i < S and S ∈ ∆. Moreover, we say that v is monotone if provided S ⊆ T ∈ ∆, then
v(S ) ≤ v(T ).
Next statement extends Theorem 3.1 of [BDJLL01] and Theorem 2 and 3 of [Web88] to every
simplicial complex.
We denote by 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 the rate of participation of the player i in the cooperative game (∆, v)
and let us rewrite the two main conditions in Theorem 3.1 of [BDJLL01]:
λi-Dummy axiom: If the player i is dummy for (∆, v), then φi(v) = λiv(i);
Monotonicity axiom: If v is monotone, then φi(v) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.1. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex on n verticies and let φi be an individual value
for a player i. The individual value φi is a R-linear function satisfying the λi-Dummy axiom
and the Monotonicity axiom if and only if there exists a collection of positive real numbers
{piT : T ∈ Link∆ i} with
(1)
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT = λi,
such that for all v in R(∆),
(2) φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
Proof. Let us first show the if part. The set {1T }T∈∆ is a basis for the vector space R(∆), so
every real valued function v can be written uniquely as v =
∑
T∈∆ 1T v(T ). By the linearity of the
function φi, we have
φi(v) = φi
∑
T∈∆
1T v(T )
 = ∑
T∈∆
φi(1T )v(T ).
We first start by showing that φi(1T ) = 0 if T ∈ ∆ but T ∪ i < ∆. Note that 1T = vT − vˆT , that
φi(vˆT ) = φi(1T∪i)v(T ∪ i), and that φi(vT ) = vT (i) = 0, because i is dummy for vT . Therefore we
get φi(1T ) = φi(vT − vˆT ) = 0.
If i ∈ T , then φi(1T ) = φi(1T ) = φi(1T\i); thus formula (2) follows from by setting
piT
def
=
φi(1T\i) i ∈ T−φi(1T ) otherwise. .
Now, let i be a dummy player for v, from (2), we get
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT v(i) =
 ∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT
 v(i).
Equation in (1) is obtained by comparing the previous equality with φi(v) = λiv(i), coming from
the λi-dummy property.
It remains to show that every piT is a real number greater or equal than zero. For this, consider
the monotone function vˆT . It is easy to see from (2) that
φi(vˆT ) = piT ,
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and the latter is non negative because vˆT is a monotone game.
Let us show the only if part. From (2), we know that φi is a linear function. Moreover, if i is
a dummy player, then v(S ∪ i) = v(S ) + v(i), so
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT v(i) = v(i)
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT = λiv(i).
Finally, if v is monotone, then v(S ∪ i) ≥ v(S ) and, so φi(v) ≥ 0. 
3. Quasi-probabilistic values
The necessary and sufficient condition of the previous theorem hints a natural generalization
of probabilistic value for simplicial complex, given for matroids in [BDJLL01].
An individual values φi is a quasi-probabilistic value if there exists a collection of positive
real numbers {
piT : T ∈ Star∆ i
}
with ∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT = λi,
such that for all v in R(∆),
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
The next statement extends Theorem 3.2 in [BDJLL01] to every simplicial complex, even not
pure ones.
Theorem 3.1. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let φi be an individual value for a player i in
[n].
The individual value φi is quasi-probabilistic if and only if there exists a probability distribu-
tion {Pi(F1), . . . , Pi(Fk)} on Facets ∆ such that
(3)
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
Pi(F) = λi
and for every F ∈ Facets∆ i there exists a probabilistic value φFi defined on the simplex F¯ such
that for all v in R(∆),
(4) φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
Pi(F)φFi (v|F),
where v|F is the restriction of the cooperative game (∆, v) to (F, v|F).
Proof. Let i be a player and let Pi be a probability distribution on Facets∆ i. Assume that for
every F facets in Facets∆ i and for every cooperative game (F,w), the individual value φFi is a
probabilistic value and, then, by Theorem 9 in [Web88], φFi is defined as
φFi (w) =
∑
T⊂F\i
piF,T (w(T ∪ i) − w(T ))
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where piF,T are non-negative real numbers such that∑
T⊂F\i
piF,T = 1.
We note that T ⊂ F \ i if and only if T ∈ Link∆ i ∩ F.
Then one can show, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [BDJLL01], that for all T in
Link∆ i
(5) piT =
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
Pi(F)piF,T .
and also
(6)
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT =
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
Pi(F).
From the last two equations, one can show easily that the provided conditions (3) and (4) are
necessary.
Let us now focus on the sufficiency of the conditions. Consider the restriction v|F of v to a
generic facet F of ∆ and consider an individual probabilistic value φFi defined on the simplex F¯.
By definition one has that
φFi (v|F) =
∑
T⊆F\i
piF,T (v|F(T ∪ i) − v|F(T )).
where
∑
T∈LinkF¯ i p
i
F,T = 1. Consider also a probability distribution P
i on Facets∆ i, that is
Pi(F) ≥ 0 and ∑F∈Facets∆ i Pi(F) = 1. Finally, from the hypothesis, we know that φi(v) =∑
T⊆F\i piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )), where
∑
T∈Link∆ i p
i
T = λi. From equation (6), one has that if such
probability distribution {Pi} exists then ∑F∈Facets∆ T∪i Pi(F) has to be equal ∑T∈Star∆ i piT and, the
latter, in the case of a probabilistic value is precisely λi.
It remains to show that φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i P
i(F)φFi (v|F) and for this we need to prove that Pi,
piS and p
i
F,S satisfy equation (5).
Given S ∈ ∆, let mS (∆) be the number of facets F of ∆ contanining S . For all facets F in Facets∆ i
denote by
Pi(F) def=
∑
T∈(Link∆ i∩F)
piT
mT∪i
;
we also observe that the sum can we simply taken over LinkF¯ i because this set equals Link∆ i∩F.
Moreover, for all facets F in Facets∆ T ∪ i and for every T ∈ LinkF i, we define
piF,T
def
=
piT
mT∪iPi(F)
.
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Now we substitute the previous value in equation (6) and one gets
piT =
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
Pi(F)piF,T
=
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
Pi(F)
piT
mT∪iPi(F)
=
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
piT
mT∪i
=
piT
mT∪i
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
1.
The equality holds because by definition
mT∪i =
∑
F∈Facets∆ T∪i
1 = |Facets∆ T ∪ i|.

As we have done in the introduction, it is important to highlight the discrepancy and the
improvement between these results and Theorem 3.2 of [BDJLL01]:
(i) i) Matroids are pure simplicial complexes that satisfies the base exchange properties
[Sta12, Sta96, Sta84, Oxl11, Mar18, BM19]. In particular, every facet has the same
cardinality, i.e. if the matroid have rank r, then every facet has cardinality r. In this
specific case, facets are called bases. The integers mS (∆) in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in
[BDJLL01] counts the number of bases (i. e. facets) of the matroid containing S . While
the concept is the same, in our proof of Theorem 3.1, mS (∆) takes in consideration facet
of different cardinality. It is quite remarkable that the probability distribution {P(Fi)} in
Theorem 3.1 can be defined in the same way regardless of the difference of rank.
(ii) Not every pure simplicial complex is a matroid. Hence our theorem applies also to the
simplicial complex described in Figure 1b. Simplicial complexes that are not matroids
are extremely important in Mathematics; few example can be found in [Mar15, GM16,
GM18].
(iii) The proof of the statements does not involve any of the matroidal properties [Sta12,
Sta96, Sta84, Oxl11]. As highlighted in the introduction, none of the matroidal property
plays a role in the proof of Theorem 2.1 and 3.1. This will be different in Section 5
where we will need our complex to be pure.
4. Group value and the core
The goal of the individual values is to assign the payoff of the grand coalition v([n]) propor-
tionally to the worth of the player. (This is, somehow, the efficient scenario: we assume that
the values are nor optimistic or pessimistic. We are going to focus on this more in details in the
subsequent section.)
Therefore, as in the traditional case, we collect all individual values together, in the group value
φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn). In [BDJLL01], they introduce the concept of basic value. In view of the
results in [Mar20a, Mar20b], we call this property reducible.
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Definition 4.1. A group value φ on R(∆) is reducible if there exists a probability distribution P
on the the facets of ∆, Facets ∆, such that
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
P(F)φFi (v|F).
where φFi is a probabilistic value for a cooperative game on the simplex F¯ and v|F is the restriction
of the characteristic function v on the simplex F, that is v|F(S ) = v(S ) for every subset S of F.
In other words, a group value is reducible if the group value can be computed reducing the coop-
erative game to k = |Facets ∆| cooperative games (F¯1, v|F1), . . . , (F¯k, v|Fk ) on the full simplicies
F¯1, . . . , F¯k.
While every component of a reducible group value φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn), is a quasi-probabilistic
value, Example 3.1 in [BDJLL01] shows that the converse in not true. This is because the distri-
bution P on the facets of ∆ needs to be unique for every vertex i.
Given a cooperative game (2n, v), the group value φ(v) detect a vector in Rn; we could also
assume that φi(v) ≥ v(i), i.e. each player does not accept any redistribution of the payoff v([n])
if it is less than v(i), the amount the player could obtain on its own. We should assume the same
for every coalition T , that is
∑
i∈T yi ≥ v(T ). Such vectors in Rn are called imputations.
Let x and y be two imputations in Rn. We say that x is dominated by y for the cooperative game
([n], v), if
(a) there exists a coalition T such that xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ T ;
(b) there exists a player i in T such that xi < yi;
(c) The coalition T can adopt y as imputation, that is
∑
i∈T yi ≥ v(T ).
In other words, the imputation y would be a better deal than x for the players in T . The core is the
set of imputations that are not dominated. This notion is used since latest 19-th century, but also
more recently appears in several research works; here just a few examples [Kan92, Gil59, AK17,
XDSS15, Ich81, BOn10, AFY17]. Mathematically, this is formulated as it follows. Assume that
for any (x1, . . . , xn) in Rn, x(S ) =
∑
i∈S xi. The core of a cooperative game ([n], v) is the following
set:
core([n], v) def= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn : x([n]) = v([n]), x(S ) ≥ v(S )∀S ⊂ [n]}.
Similarly, we define the anticore as
anticore([n], v) def= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn : x([n]) = v([n]), x(S ) ≤ v(S )∀S ⊂ [n]}.
Definition 4.2. Given a simplicial complex ∆ over n verticies with facets Facets ∆, the facet
polytope Q∆ is the convex hull in Rn of vectors eF =
∑
i∈F ei for every facet F in Facets ∆, where
ei is a standard orthonormal basis of Rn:
Q∆ = convex{eF : F ∈ Facets ∆}.
The facet polytope and the core do not just share the ambient space. Indeed, when ∆ = M is a
matroid, then QM is the base polytope, also called matroid polytope, (see for instance Chapter 9
of [BLVS+93]) and Edmonds [Edm70] has shown that QM is the anti-core of of the game ([n], r),
where r is the rank function of the matroid M,
(7) anticore([n], rkM) = QM.
This was also reproved in Theorem 2.3 of [BDJLL01].
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Moreover, when ∆ = 2[n] is the full simplex, Weber [Web88] shows the core of the game is
contained in the so called Weber set. Let us recall the definition of Weber set and this result. Let
S n be the set of bijective function from [n] to [n]. For every such bijective function pi, we list the
image of each element in a unique ordered set pi = (pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) and we denote for any i ∈ [n]
by pii def= { j ∈ [n] : pi( j) < pi(i)}. Let (2n, v) be a cooperative game and we define the marginal
worth vector api(v) as the imputation satisfying apii (v) = v(pi
i ∪ i) − v(pii) for all i in [n]. Let the
Weber set be the set of all imputations which are associated with v by some random-order value
(that is equivalent, under the efficiency axiom to an efficient probabilistic group value), that is:
Weber(2n, v) def= convex{api(v) : pi ∈ S n}
Theorem 4.1 (Thm 14 in [Web88], Shapley [Sha72] and Ichiishi [Ich81]). For any cooperative
game ([n], v), core([n], v) ⊆Weber([n], v). The equality holds if the game is convex.
We denote by Prob ∆ the set of probability distribution over the set of facets of ∆, that is:
Prob ∆ def= {P ∈ R|Facets ∆| : P(F) ≥ 0 and
∑
F∈Facets ∆
P(F) = 1}.
Associated to a probability distribution P in Prob ∆, following Section 4 of[BDJLL01], we also
define the probabilistic participation influence wP(T ) of T as
wP(T ) =
∑
T⊂F∈Facets ∆
P(F).
If T is not in ∆ then wP(T ) = 0; this can also be seen using the previous definition as T is not a
subset of any facet of ∆.
In Proposition 4.1 of [BDJLL01], using Edmonds [Edm70] results in (7), they are able to prove
that
anticore([n], rkM)
(7)
= QM = {wP : P ∈ Prob M}.
While the same equality between the anticore and the facet polytope in (7) does not hold also for
a generic simplicial complex, we are able to prove that Q∆ = {wP : P ∈ Prob ∆}. Aside of the
generalization per se of the result in [BDJLL01], one perk of next proposition is that we do not
use Edmond result or any connection with the anticore of the cooperative game.
Theorem 4.2. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let r be its rank function. Then
Q∆ = {wP : P ∈ Prob ∆}.
Proof. Let q be an element in Q∆: q can be written as a convex linear combination of the inci-
dence vectors of the facets {eF}, that is q = ∑F αFeF with αF ≥ 0 and ∑F αF = 1. If we set
P(F) def= αF , then q = wP. The opposite inclusion follows similarly. 
5. Reducible quasi-probabilistic values
In the traditional theory, a cooperative game is defined on the full simplex ∆ = 2[n] and the
Shapley values are probabilistic values arising from the following common point of view among
the players: The player i joins a coalitions of different sizes with the same probability; All
coalition of the same size are equally likely.
Thus, the every player has n possibilities to choose the size of a coalition (the joint coalitions
may have cardinality k = 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1) and, further, there are
(
n−1
k
)
choices among all sets
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(coalitions) of cardinality k among the other players [n] \ i. Therefore, one defines the Shapley
values for the player i as
Shapleyi(v) =
∑
T⊆[n]\i
1
n
|T |!(n − |T | − 1)!
(n − 1)! (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )).
The classical Shapley Theorem characterizes Shapley values as follow:
Theorem 5.1 (Shapley’s Theorem, see for instance [Web88]). Let (n, v) belong to a cone I
of cooperative games containing the carrier games C and Cˆ. Assume that if v ∈ I, then the
permuted game pi · v is also in I for every permutation pi of [n]. Let φ be a group value.
If each φi is a linear function that satisfies the dummy axiom and the monotonicity axiom and
if the symmetric and the efficiency axioms hold for the groups value φ, then for every cooperative
game (n, v) in the domain of φ and every i in [n],
φi(v) = Shapleyi(v).
In [BDJLL01], they characterize when in individual value can be written as weighted sum of
Shapley values defined on the bases of a matroids.
All these results together allow us to generalize the main theorem of [BDJLL01] to pure
simplicial complex.
Theorem 5.2. Let ∆ be a pure simplicial complex on n verticies and and let φi be the individual
value for a player i. The group value φ is reducible and it decomposes as the weighted sum of
Shapley values,
φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets∆ i
P(F) ShapleyF(v|F)
if and only if each φi is a linear function that satisfies the wP(i)-dummy axiom and the group
value fulfills the following two axioms:
Substitution for carrier games: For every coalition T and for every pair of players, one
has φi(vT ) = φ j(vT );
Probabilistic efficiency: For every cooperative game (∆, v),
∑
i φi(v) =
∑
F∈Facets ∆ P(F)v(F).
Proof. Part of the characterization, follows form the ones in Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 3.1.
The Substitution for carrier games axioms imposes that locally each individual value has to be
of a Shapley one with maximal facet of the same cardinality. Finally, the Probabilistic efficiency
provides the requested weighted sum. 
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